Abstract This paper is about people. It is about understanding how learning and communication mutually influence one another; allowing people to infer each other's communicative behavior. In order to understand how people learn to communicate, we refer to existing theories. They are the logical theories of learning and communication, situated cognition and activity theory. Thus, this paper is about applying existing theories of analyzing conversations, human learning, and memory to a range of scenarios of actual human conversations. It is also introducing a new way of analyzing conversations. We have recorded and observed actual human communications on the web. We have applied those theories to analyze these communication scenarios. We describe the preliminary results on the analyses of the communication scenarios. In particular, we show our analysis of the recorded conversational structures. We illustrate how the re-enacting and re-sequencing of conversational structures is adapted to the context (i.e. environment) moment by moment. From our analyses, we found that people have internal rules (e.g., a combinatorial rule system). These internal rules can be related to how a person learn, adapt and merge protocols situated in their context of communication. Our long term goal is to make use of these analyses to improve human communication on the GRID.
Introduction 2
Our study is centered on understanding how people learn to communicate. We have narrowed the study to analyzing communication protocols among group members on the web. These group members are Computer 1 Work partially supported by the European Community under the Information Society Technologies (IST) programme of the 6th Framework Programme for RTD -project ELeGI, contract IST-002205. This document does not represent the opinion of the European Community, and the European Community is not responsible for any use that might be made of data appearing therein. 2 The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive and helpful comments.
communication is the basis of interaction and social organization. A modeling is needed to allow agents that can "talk" to each other. Its function should be to enable the agents to decide what action to take and how this action can be coordinated with others' action (Draa et al., 2002) . The main objective of ACL is to model a framework that allows heterogeneous agents to interact, to communicate with meaningful statements that convey information about their environment or knowledge (Draa et al., 2002) . The key concept in agent is interoperability and autonomy. Due to this autonomy of modeling the agents, several researchers such as (Greaves et al., 2002; Draa et a 2002; Cohen et al., 2003; Van Eijk et al., 2003; Huget et al., 2003; Singh et al., 2003) have focused on how to model a sophisticated system of agent communication.
Speech acts theory is used to model conversations for agent based communication. Prescribing this notion of speech acts assumes agents to be sincere when communicating. It also pre-supposes the ability that the agents 6 Agent communication languages are specification languages for agents to communicate information and knowledge.
Website: http://www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00037/SC00037J.html 7 We have extended the formal model of the FIPA-ACL communicative acts using the activity states framework Binti Abdullah, 2005) . 8 A MAS according to (Ferber, 1997 ) is a modeling of several located agents (that could be heterogeneous) in an agent/environment duality. This is the focus of the located MAS. In acting on the basis of its perception of physical space and of direct communication it receives, the agent defines itself as the dual image of its environment. The author (Ferber, 1996) suggests that the creation of located MAS requires the simultaneous definition of the structure of the agents and that of the environment, and the actions of the agents having to be carried out within that environment.
complexity of information and computing resources. Here, we try to imagine how our work can possibly help us (and others) to construct useful tools. Let us assume that an agent can recognize (recognizing in some ways requires learning of that event before recognizing that event as being that event) that the sequence of events the agent is located in is that the user is "debugging" a tool (my webcam is not functioning during FlashMeeting). This agent can anticipate that whenever such similar notion of debugging a tool is re-encounter, it will know what to specifically select from the conversation policy/protocols during communication. The agent also learns gradually from the breakdown occurrences what is the most effective message/policy composition to send to other communicating agents.
ordering of his ideas about learning in a hierarchy structure following the laws of motion. Figure 1 below is our own summary of the hierarchy of learning of (Bateson, 1972) which had been summarized from pages 287-305. Referring to figure 1 above; zero learning is the basics of all learning. It is in some degrees stochastic and contains components of trial and error. The curved arrows represent that the one level up in the hierarchy of learning types is described by the motion of change of the level below it. In short, we can summarize it as (i) zero learning: is described by which response is right or wrong and is not subject to correction; (ii) learning I: is described by the change in the specificity of response by correction of errors of choice within a set of alternatives; (iii) learning II: is described as the change of process of learning I; a corrective change in the set of alternatives from which choice is made, or it is a change in how the sequence of experience is punctuated; (iv) learning III: is described as the change of process in learning II; a corrective change in the system of sets of alternatives from which choice is made. We look only at learning type zero, I and II. Bateson (1972) also discusses learning IV, however we do not illustrate it here as it involves a higher level of learning type that is tied to evolutionary processes.
The basic elements that distinguish one type of learning from the other are characterized by contexts. 
Situated Cognition and Activity Theory
In the previous section, we have discussed the general statement of the problem. The main contribution is to tackle the "basic problems" or the notion of "breakdown". We have also briefly reviewed the theory of learning and communication of (Bateson, 1972) in section 3.1. In this section, we discuss two other major existing theories; situated cognition and activity theory. These two theories provide us as a fundamental framework for answering the two major points mentioned in section 3.1.
Firstly, situated cognition by (Clancey, 1997a ) is based on the idea that every human thought and action is adapted to the environment that is situated. The term "situated" means that people are not just located a socialphysical setting. Rather the context for the people is also categorical through perception and conception. That is the context/environment for a person is a mental construction. Hence, situated cognition looks into: (i) What people perceive (structural view); (ii) How they conceive their activity (functional view) and (iii) What they physically do together (behavioral view). It is also concerned with representing, e.g. an object, that occurs in the brain (like imagining a scene, or speaking to oneself). Having this representation from an agent's perspective involves intentionality (Clancey, 1997a) .
On the other hand, activity theory of (Leont'ev, 1978 ) is concerned about how consciousness (e.g., motives, intentions) arise within-and during the coordination and conceptualization of their daily activities. It emphasizes that internal activities cannot be understood if they are analyzed separately, in isolation from external activities.
It also emphasizes that the organism is doing something all the time (the essence of the word "activity") and that subjectivity is realized within and constructed by interaction (Clancey, 2002) . The basic components of separate human activities are the actions that realize them. Action is regarded as the process that corresponds to the notion of the result which must be achieved.
Referring to Bateson (see section 3.1), change denotes processes, and learning signify change. Behaving is an action (and behaving is a response). In the scope of activity theory, action is regarded as the process that corresponds to what is to be achieved and the process which obeys to what are the conscious goals of the object.
We try to simplify the connection in both theories into equation Eq. (1) (2): these "changes" take place in the process that is influenced from the objective world (an environment, or what I "perceive"). These changes occur as an intermediary process that is somehow responsible in behaving, learning, doing something to achieve a goal (in activities). And how one is learning when doing something changes what one is doing in the objective world and the response of that subject in that objective world is a behavior that is communication.
In a nutshell, the situated cognition theory sits on the activity theory; using it as a framework for relating how actions in daily activities can explain how human thoughts is situated and adapted (Clancey, 1997b (Clancey, & 2002 . On the other hand, the logical theories of learning and communication sit in-and between these two theories. To summarize this section, situated cognition provides us with a backbone framework for understanding the mechanisms that can be fitted in-it to explain how human thought and action is adapted to the environment moment by moment in a context/environment. This research approach considers the human mechanisms from multiple perspectives. These multiple views of association of mechanisms are crucial for the complete understanding of our own notion of how communications protocols are learned, punctuated, induced, merged and adapted to the situated context/environment.
Therefore, to summarize, these existing theories are necessary for us to take on, so that we can explain:
• how a person coordinates (i.e. situated cognition) as a whole;
• by conceptualizing her context (i.e. situated cognition, learning and communication);
• of what her activity is (i.e. situated cognition, activity theory) when communicating (i.e. learning and communication, situated cognition) structured by her internal rules.
When we speak of internal rules, we refer to the manner a person is structuring her learning and understanding.
This will be discussed in section 6.
Related Work
Our approach to the analysis of conversations is a rather different way of looking into languages. In this section, we discuss the speech act theory (Searle, 1969; Searle et al., 1985) . The theory of speech acts aims to do justice to the fact that even though words (phrases, sentences) encode information, people do more things with words than just to convey information. And that when people do convey information, they often convey more than their words encode. The main idea is that a sentence describes some state of affairs, rather than just "state some fact", which can only be either true or false. The focus of speech acts has been on utterances, especially those made in conversational and other face-to-face situations. Because of its clear framework, speech act theory has been well integrated into agent communication languages such as FIPA-ACL, and KQML.
In (Searle, 1983) , the author had extended this representation of speech acts to the notion of intentionality.
In this notion of intentionality, the author explores the connection between intentional states and speech acts in order to answer "What is the relationship between the intentional state and the object or state of affairs that it is in some sense directed at?" As an example, a statement of someone that is raining is a representation of a certain state of affairs, so the belief of that person that it is raining is a representation of a certain state of affairs.
However, speech act theory only consider: (i) isolated acts, the initial utterance, with its condition of application, and the local effects which it can have on the interlocutors (Ferber, 1997) ; and (ii) the sequence of interactions which is established between the interlocutors during their communications or their reciprocal expectations in conversations (not the in-between sequences).
On the other hand, the notion of intentionality considers a strict mind-to-world and world-to-mind fit. That is to say, it does not consider the multiple features existing in the world to mind fit, like the activity a person is engaged with, for instance using a tool. Actions are analyzed based on the act of "perceiving" of an object or doing an action at a moment. The analysis (both speech acts and intentionality) does not include the act of using a tool as a mediator for accomplishing an action. Secondly, it suggests that neither memory nor the prior intention (like motivations, deliberation) is essential to the visual perception of a person or the intentional action respectively (Searle, 1983) 13 .
In section 6.1 onwards, we show that somehow memory does play a role to the visual perception of a person and that this must be considered when analyzing conversational structures. A visual perception is not merely an act of seeing a flower, an "objectified" image (like cars, tree). Instead, visual perception includes reading a text.
When reading a text, there is an act of coupling the sentences with how one is understanding and remembering.
Thus, we prefer to adopt the notion of intentionality by (Clancey, 1997a) . The representation of intentionality is influenced by the behavior and the context of action. The behavior and response (and even speech and reading a text) of a person is articulated and adapted in the context she is situated in. It is influenced by the current activity she is engaged it.
Preliminary results on analysis of the conversational structures
We review the collaborating scenarios. Pete is the project manager for this joint project and he was new to this environment (i.e. instant messaging and video-conferencing). Mathew, on the other hand, is an experienced collaborator and has run many virtual collaborations. Everyday Mathew and Pete go online to chat about the project. Pete's job was to make sure everyone does his/her share of work, and respect the deadlines in order to achieve their shared goals together. Before the FlashMeeting reported hereafter, at the start of the collaboration, Mathew had taught privately Pete how to use the tool. During the first meeting held among some of the collaborating members, Pete carried out his role. In this section, we focus on one of the collaborators, Pete. We look into his conversational structures. In the remaining subsections, we shall illustrate three findings from our analyses. Section 4.1 is on the reshuffling/re-sequencing of the conversational structures. Section 4.2 is on the merging of the protocols of Mathew's into Pete. Section 4.3 is on the adaptation of the protocols of Pete's 13 Of course, this is not to say that we reject the notion of speech acts and intentionality. Indeed we do not, because using FIPA-ACL as our formal model for agent language goes back to the speech act theory. In our conversion steps we have incorporated (using speech act theory as basic units) a different kind of perspective inspired by those three existing theories discussed in section 3 for analyzing conversations. We must consider this because currently tools are beginning to play a significant role in our daily web communications. situated in context/environment.
The re-shuffling/re-sequencing of memory in re-enacting communication protocols
This section will discuss the reshuffling/re-sequencing of the conversational structures coupled to memory. We illustrate a particular scenario. Two similar events took place during the meetings; E 1 , E 2 where we label them as context c 1 and c 2 respectively.
Both were about how to give instructions on using FlashMeeting. It also took place at the beginning of the meetings. Below, are the conversations in agent communication messages format. This is the first level of abstraction. which is an abbreviation used for the sentence). For a greeting sentence like "Good Afternoon" or "Hey" the content of the communicative act is simplified and abbreviated as u. The content will be referred as a parameter in the remaining of the section.
The words in bold like bt, brdc are the words that had re-appeared in the conversational structures of Pete.
They are particular parameters that Pete had remembered well. We illustrate in figure 2 below, of how the resequencing/re-shuffling of the re-enacting of Mathew's communication protocol by Pete had taken place. In figure 2 , we represent the conversational structures as blocks. The first block refers to the conversational structures of Mathew and the second to Pete. We refer this as blocks, because it represents a sort of punctuated "experience" of Pete.
The conversational block has been labelled with a "start" and an "end" 22 (Bateson 1972; Maue 1979; Richards 1965 ; Jackendoff book in-progress). The start and the end represent the start and the end of the communication protocols of Mathew and Pete respectively. From a different perspective, it also represents the beginning of Pete remembering the "experienced event", and the ending of how he ends the "remembering of that event". But we are not suggesting that the memory "halts" abruptly just after that. This will be discussed properly section 5.
We discuss figure 2 . First of all, readers notice that message 31 of Mathew corresponds to message number 4
of Pete. When we say the term "corresponds" we are referring to the idea that the content of this block (message 
Looking for the merging of communication protocols
Continuing from the previous section, we now look into the next level of detail: if there is any merging of communication protocols. The difference between figure 3 below and 2 in the above section, is that we eliminate events". The start, end notion have been referred to as different terms. The terms such as: frames by (Jackendoff book inprogress), procedures by (Maue, 1979) , communication structures by (Richards, 1965) and "punctuation" by (Bateson, 1972) . The shared idea is there is some kind of an opening, pause and ending to a certain "punctuated event". In (Clancey, 2004) , the author had suggested that this idea is general in how people organize a variety of their joint behavior. 23 In (Clancey, 2000) , the author had discussed whether "abstraction" is some kind of an idea of how conceptualization works. In particular, from page 3, the author had given a scenario of scientists reasoning by analogy from their general understanding. From the author's observation, these scientists have gone from the particular (observable features on Mars) to the abstract (theories about liquids) and back to the specific (a causal story about ice dams on Mars). According to the author, this is an abstraction at work. For now, we use the notion generalization in our analysis, but it does seem similar to the author's notion of abstraction.
the middle blocks (messages number 37 until 39). Thus, we focus only on those messages of Mathew that had reappeared in the conversational structures of Pete. Refer to figure 4, compare pattern 1, to 2, and 3 of Mathew. We can note that in each pattern 1, 2, and 3 the communicative acts; inform-ref is communicated before the request-whenever or confirm acts. Now, we compare this pattern of Mathew to Pete's very own pattern. He had informed first of the button (features of the button) and then requested to Iris on how to make use of the functions of that button. had made references to the button (bt). We also notice, that he had merged the communication protocols (i.e., describe first then inform of the function of the button) into Pete's own manner of communicating. In a way, Pete had communicated like how Mathew had: incrementally, then making reference to the button, and then requesting the user how to perform those actions. The merging can be observed two ways:
• The arrangements of the communicative act (patterns) of what comes between, and after.
• Those regularities of pattern arrangements along with the re-sequencing of the parameters.
Taking these into consideration portray some kind of structures or articulation of thoughts. It demonstrates some kind of "active organization". In order to support our suppositions; we move on to the next section. 
Looking for the adaptation of communication protocols in situated context
Now, in order to carefully identify the patterns of the communication protocols of Pete, we look into a different context of communication. Readers recall section 3.1 on the logical theory of learning and communication of (Bateson, 1972) . This section will focus specifically on the two main points mentioned previously; the presence of "a new face" as being one of the "start" signals in the external event system (which had been mentioned in section 3.1). This "new face" is perceived as a stimulus for Pete's behavior. And how Pete responds to that behavior is by learning to select from his set of contexts (i.e. all the related events) the next alternatives he takes. Firstly, we look into similar events (similar contexts of communication Since we will only illustrate the conversational structures of Pete's, we represent the messages as a second-level abstraction, abbreviating only the communicative act and the parameters (eliminating the message number, sender and receiver). 24 We had collected about 7 similar contexts for comparison; refer to the Annex for the samples. 25 The complete conversations are not shown to protect the privacy of the individuals and the ongoing project. 26 We use this notation to represent the sameness of context of y at time 1 and context of y at time 2. The context y cannot be the same at time 1 and time 2 (Bateson, 1972) . Figure 6 and 7 below, illustrates the flow of sequences of the conversation structures of Pete. Refer to figure 6 and 7, and again to table 2 the first and second column. They correspond to figure 6 and figure 7 respectively. They are the illustrations of the conversation sequences of Pete's during two similar contexts.
Please note that for example, y1, y2 are not similar parameters.
First, we illustrate the differences. The communicative act rw (i.e. request when), cfp (i.e. call for proposal) and c (i.e. confirm) is not communicated during context c 2 . The communicative act rwv (i.e. request whenever) is not communicated during context c 3 .
We illustrate the similarities: both communications begin with the communicative act g (i.e. greet), has ir (i.e.
inform-ref).
We illustrate the flow of the sequences. The communicative acts ir (i.e. inform-ref) does not precede i (i.e. inform), and follows immediately after i, cfp, rw and c; in c 3 .
Firstly, from the differences; we make a hypothesis that the selection of communicative acts is contextualized and influenced by the mental states (and mental states are influenced by the activity one is engaged in) of the speaker. For example A) request when (i.e. rw) is communicated to request the listener to perform an action as soon he believes in having to do it. On the other hand, B) the communicative act request whenever (i.e. rwv) is communicated to request the listener to perform it whenever she re-encounters similar situations. A) is a context that request temporary respond during that ongoing discussion (i.e. inform me during this meeting what we must do). B) is a context such that it requests that at anytime a similar context appears, the partner should respond in a similar way (i.e. whenever you have something to say when using this tool, please take this action).
Secondly, from the flow of the sequences of both c 2 and c 3, we notice the following. The sequences are resequenced and then re-enacted accordingly to how the individual is contextualizing. Inform-ref (i.e. ir) is used frequently to give description to an object. It is also communicated to give description of the request made and to
give description of support for the call for proposal. Finally, it is also communicated to give description of support to the uncertainty of certain knowledge of an object. This is quite an obvious analysis. There could be two possibilities why Pete had used this communicative act in this context. First, it demonstrates the reflection of the reasoning of the speaker. This reflection again is dependent on the subject that the speaker wishes to communicate about; or of his learned experiences.
Refer again to section 4.2 on the merging of the communication protocols. We had made an assumption that Pete had merged the communication protocol of Mathew into his own. Later, this merging had been adapted when he had re-encountered a similar situation. Readers note that the arrangements of the communicative acts and its parameters differ from Pete's ways of communicating in similar context. Comparing c 3 to the other context of communication (see Annex); so far we notice that Pete normally gives direction of what to do first, and then followed by description on why to do it. Mathew normally gives description first (explaining first), then requesting to do it. In that particular context c 2 (see figure 7 ) of Pete, he had for the first time, communicated in that similar way (like Mathew, give description first). It may not seem like a very strong support, thus we shall discuss it in the next section.
5 Re-sequencing, re-enacting, merging and adaptation: Some explanations
In sections 4.1 until section 4.3, we have reviewed four types of occurrences: re-sequencing, re-enacting, merging, and adaptation. It is quite hard to clearly separate these analyses, because they seem to be associated to one another either at the same level or lower-higher level. The lower-higher level refers to specialization-generalization of the context of communication. We have only bits and pieces of information to explain the occurrences. We had focused on those occurrences that may exhibit some kind of articulation of thoughts; like the conceptualization and contextualization of the speech, moment by moment. The arrangements of the communicative acts with its associated parameters demonstrate a kind of organization ("an active organization") of processes. An active organization which we refer to as "what is the attention at that given moment --which is "what is the focus of the subject at that moment" the activity of speaking and/or typing texts.
In order to better understand those occurrences; it is important to relate our analyses back to section 3. We review some of the terms described in (Clancey, 1997a) . (iii) Events: Is defined as having a quality as a whole. Quality is defined as the total meaning of the event.
(iv) Situations: Situations is a pointer for re-encountering the set of contexts and is partially constructed within the interpretation process.
(v) Learning zero, I and II: The unidentified operators responsible for the changes of the learning types (i.e. refer to figure 2, section 2.1) as reported by (Bateson 1972 ).
First we discuss the learning of an experience. An experience is learning of an event, and remembering this event when re-encountering situations resembling the previous learned events. This process changes in time.
Thus, context is not a simple variable that is manipulated. It is constructed by the subject, in an ongoing manner (Clancey, 1997a) . We use the notion contextualizing and context inter-dependently. Contextualizing is a whole process of coordination (i.e. from the social and biological perspective). Context is then the lying ground of events. A set of contexts is thus defined as set of events having a certain degree of similarity among one another.
Refer again to the logical theories of (Bateson, 1972) which we briefly described in section 3.1. We take the 27 Contextualism involves a shift in emphasis from traditional learning theory approach and from a traditional processmodeling approach, to a description of knowing in terms of the situational and task variables which define experimental situations and which constrain subjects into behaving "as if" they possess a particular form of knowledge (Hoffman, 1983) . Contextualists reject the Cartesian doctrine that learning results in static mental copies of things in the world, they reject the representation/process dualism that is inherent in mechanistic and information processing views (Hoffman, 1986) .
external event systems as our primary source for investigation. How can the logical theories of learning and communication be traced to the conversational structures which we had analyzed? Looking into the arrangements of conversational structures may show us dynamic changes of sentences constructions which can demonstrate some kind of changes of process. Learning denotes change of some kind. Refer again to figure 1 in section 3.1, which level of learning had taken place? We can only speculate for now that during the event where
Pete had communicated similar like Mathew in a similar context; learning II had taken place for Pete. Learning II can also be described as a change in how the sequence of experience is punctuated. Pete had somehow correctly "punctuated" that event as being that event for giving instructions to newcomers . Pete recognized it as a context to give instructions. Now, if we refer again to (Bateson, 1972) , learning II is described as a change of process in learning I. However, for now, we cannot figure out how learning 0/I had "jumped" to II.
Refer again to the Annex on some samples of the converted conversations. In these samples, we label the set of FlashMeeting. He re-encountered this situation, and recognized that as being that particular event. He proceeded to give instructions to this newcomer. We then generalize these similar contexts that can be roughly described belonging to a context class "giving instructions". However, giving instructions can be a variety of sort. (ii) Learning new communication protocols involves the merging and adaptation of others (i.e. from experiences or individuals when re-encountering similar situations) to our own internal rules.
Conclusions and perspectives
We have noticed two phenomenons from the analysis: (i) inherent in individual, there are internal rules (e.g., combinatorial rule systems); (ii) the adaptation and merging of protocols; is improvised by induction. Induction is one of the characteristics of human reasoning, that we form generalizations based on our experience or observations. Through observations and experiences one learns. When humans experience certain situations, they learn and keep that in memory. These experiences are learned over time. People apply their own protocols and induce, merge and adapt new ones when communicating with one another in a new environment when they re-encounter similar contexts; adapting to experience (i.e. learning). When they re-encounter similar situations, they are in fact inducing situations which are to them similar to the previous ones by remembering. How those internal changes of process of merging and adapting is influenced by their internal rules. However, for now, we cannot give a solid definition of internal rules. The closest meaning we can derive from this notion, is in relationship to the manner how a person is constantly adapting her action and thoughts to the context of her communication. For example, she can tell if context 1 is similar to context 2 and so on. If she re-encounters a situation that reminds her of context 1, she can readily perceive or recognize what is a correct way to behave. On the other hand, when she re-encounters context 3 that is not in any way similar to context 2, she resumes to another manner of communicating. But the way she improvises her communications is done in the manner how she learns. Her internal rules suggest how she articulates her actions and thoughts to the adapted context. Our particular observation of this phenomenon reminds us of the theory of (Jackendoff, book in-progress) on what he calls as a "combinatorial rule system in mind of language user". The author (Jackendoff, book in-progress) (from page 4-3) discussed that learning must involve creation of organization in the mind/brain of the learner. He further remarked that it may or not involve "active teaching" on the part of those with whom the learner interact.
Since these inner resources are by definition not learned, thus must be a consequence of the inherent structure of human.
Does the combinatorial rule systems have linkages to (Bateson, 1972) logical theory of learning and communication? Since, from our observation, we have noticed that there is some kind of "semi-constant" manner to how the person re-sequences, re-enacts, merge, and adapts her choice of actions in a situated context.
Thus, there are two major points which we will further look into: events and context. They both suggest some The potential impact of our work with respect to GRID's development has to be shown and demonstrated. For the moment, a few intuitions do not allow us to make strong claims, even if the trends in GRID research are for us extremely promising:
1. GRID and Agent's technology (and social models) seem to show synergies and perhaps confluences (Foster et al., 2005; Cerri, 2005) .
2. Within the current GRID research, there is a strong need for including the Human in the loop, i.e.
considering Humans as part of Virtual Organization/Communities and therefore designing specifications that enable Humans to become service providers and consumers by respecting rules associated to these specifications.
3. While previous generations of GRID related activities, were mainly concerned with distributed computations, current GRID applicative scenarios specifically address the use of GRIDs for facilitating and enhancing human to human collaboration at a distance.
For all those reasons, our quite preliminary results may indeed feed into the evolution of technologies such as those of Semantic GRIDs, for instance the specifications of virtualized interfaces to humans, as proposed by (Dugenie, 2005; Dugenie et al., 2005) .
